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(London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine)
Introduction
In considering the balance of public and private in the history of 
the British hospital, we may helpfully think in three, rather than just 
two categories: public, private and ‘voluntary’. We may also distinguish 
different periods, particularly across the juncture of 1948, when the 
establishment of the National Health Service (NHS) disrupted existing 
patterns of ownership and financing and heralded a period of active 
management by the central state. Crudely we can classify the public 
hospitals as those funded principally by taxation and overseen by some 
appointed or elected body subject to statutory regulation. The private 
hospitals we may consider as those run for profit and privately owned. 
The voluntary hospitals we may understand as those financed prin-
cipally by philanthropy or mutual funds, staffed largely by honorary 
consultants, constituted as charitable trusts and managed by volunteer 
committees. In the British narrative, the for-profit hospitals do not fig-
ure significantly, though there were numerous nursing and maternity 
homes, commercial ‘lunatic asylums’ and private beds or wings within 
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voluntary hospitals; private hospitals remained of limited scale under the 
NHS. Thus, the dynamic of most interest is that between the voluntary 
and public sectors before 1948, and within the public sector afterwards.
The British hospital has an established narrative of change, 
broadly understood as a social response to industrialisation.1 
The public hospital emerged from the Poor Law workhouse and 
was systematically developed in the Victorian period. Psychiatric 
hospitals—‘asylums’—were predominantly provided by county or 
municipal councils and from the 1870s local government also over-
saw isolation hospitals for infectious diseases. Voluntary hospitals 
emerged in the eighteenth century, then proliferated, generally pri-
oritising acute but non-infectious diseases, and leaving long-stay, 
‘chronic’ and psychiatric patients to the public sector. This changed 
in the twentieth century as municipal hospitals and public infirma-
ries expanded general care. A radical break occurred in 1948, when 
the NHS Acts took the voluntary hospitals into public ownership, 
also incorporating local government hospitals, public asylums and 
many ex-Poor Law institutions. NHS history breaks into an early 
statist period marked by central planning, albeit ineffective, then 
from the 1980s an effort to introduce market disciplines under the 
aegis of ‘neo-liberalism’. There was also a trend of dehospitalisation, 
as technological and surgical processes allowed for shorter stays and 
community treatment. 
The aim of this chapter is to explain the changing relationship 
between public, private and voluntary sectors over this long peri-
od. As a framing device, it will use a body of theory drawn prin-
cipally from welfare economics, which makes normative claims 
about the strengths and weaknesses of each sector. After introducing 
these ideas, the discussion that follows asks how adequately they 
address four questions that are not usually confronted explicitly: 
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1. How to explain the growth of the hospital since the eighteenth 
century, and the distribution of activity between private, 
public and voluntary sectors?
2. How to explain the transfer of control from the voluntary 
sector and local government to the central state in the NHS 
system reform of 1946-8?
3. How to explain the pattern of decline of the hospital in 
the later twentieth century, and the distribution of activity 
between the public and private sectors?
4. How to explain and appraise the market-oriented manage-
ment reforms adopted in the NHS since the 1980s?
The analysis synthesises existing work based on what is already 
a rich literature, combining policy history with a strong quantitative 
underpinning. 
Market, voluntary and state failure
A preliminary conceptual framework to aid thinking about the 
sectoral dynamics of the British hospital is presented in Figure 5.1. 
This proposes various positive ‘virtues’ of the market, voluntary 
institutions, and the state as providers of health care, and also various 
inherent ‘failures’ that may explain why each predominates at differ-
ent times. As outlined below, it is constructed from the longstanding 
literature of welfare economists, and more recently from the fields of 
health economics and third sector analysis. 
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Figure 5.1: A conceptual model of hospital sectors in time
It is axiomatic to classical economic theory that free markets can 
most directly satisfy human needs. Competition drives innovation and 
quality, the price mechanism optimises the balance between supply 
and demand, and an ‘invisible hand’ ensures that by meeting individ-
ual utility markets will increase the general welfare.2 However, theory 
had also to contend with the growth of public expenditure. Adolph 
Wagner’s ‘law’, propounded in Bismarckian Germany, first claimed 
this as an inexorable concomitant of economic growth.3 Later there 
developed the concept of public goods, whose benefits (‘positive exter-
nalities’) extended to all, not just their immediate purchasers—urban 
sanitation systems that reduce infectious disease, for example. To avert 
‘free riding’ by other beneficiaries, collective intervention could be jus-
tified. Another market failure could arise from imperfect information, 
where the purchaser lacked the requisite knowledge to assess the price 
of a technically complex service, such as medicine. This introduced a 
‘trust failure’, where sellers might be tempted to profiteer, particularly if, 
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as in the case of doctors, they exercised a professional monopoly. It was 
also arguable that health care was not really a consumer good at all, 
because the catastrophic expense of serious illness might price supply 
beyond the means of average earners.4
What about voluntarism? An economic ‘language of sectors’ 
emerged in the mid-twentieth century, making general claims about 
the capabilities and limits of charity, as it reoriented under the welfare 
state.5 This asserted the voluntary sector’s role was to pioneer new forms 
of intervention, reach hitherto neglected groups, produce individualised 
services, and advocate for change. In this sense, it could address insuf-
ficiencies of supply when catastrophic costs threatened and, because 
it was premised on philanthropic ethics, could resolve trust failures. 
It was also unfettered by the bureaucracy or need for consent that accom-
panied state action.6 However, voluntary failures were also observed. 
The problem remained of free riders enjoying the positive externalities 
funded by charitable citizens alone, not least in public health.7 Other 
weaknesses were a lack of co-ordinating mechanisms, undemocratic 
governance, under-resourcing, amateurism of the workforce and polit-
ical ineffectiveness. Third sector theorists subsequently augmented this 
catalogue. Philanthropy was inherently insufficient and geographically 
uneven, because its spontaneous nature, its reliance on wealthy givers, 
and its lack of coordinating mechanisms meant that supply could not 
match demand. Charity’s paternalist and hierarchical overtones also 
offended equity considerations.8
These failures opened the way for the state. Whether through man-
datory insurance or social security, public funding ensured sufficiency 
of supply while averting free riding in the provision of public goods. 
Planned distribution could overcome geographical or social uneven-
ness, and bureaucrats appointed on merit could deliver professional 
administration. Trust failures from information asymmetries could 
be overcome through expert oversight of pricing, and sanctions. Yet 
The Political Economy of the Hospital in History
18610.5920/PoliticalEconomy.05
against these virtues, the lineaments of state failure were soon set out, 
both by Hayekian neo-liberals and by rational choice theorists. Because 
bureaucrats seek to maximise their own utility rather than pursuing the 
public interest, they will try always to enlarge departmental budgets 
to obtain status and power.9 Nor does the state necessarily prevent 
rent-seeking by professionals.10 Instead there is a tendency to ‘provider 
capture’ by public employees—doctors, nurses, administrators—who 
organise services to suit their own preferences, not the consumers’.11 
The patient meanwhile lacked the levers of ‘voice and exit’, which in 
market settings would permit the expression of demand.12
So much for theory—what about application to historical exam-
ples? To the extent they exist, these addressed the supersession of 
voluntary, local or market approaches by the central state.Wagner 
had attributed his ‘law’ to technological costs, the desire for educa-
tion and culture, and the social frictions arising from urbanisation. 
Polanyi argued that the ‘practical and pragmatic’ advance of social 
legislation responded to the ‘objective’ needs of industrial societies 
to manage the ‘weaknesses … inherent in a self-regulating market’, 
a functionalist ‘countermove’ against ‘degradation’.13 Peacock and 
Wiseman’s long-run study of British public expenditure observed this 
rising at a far greater rate than GDP, indicating a ‘natural ... propensity’ 
of democratic citizens to consume desirable services, compounded 
by the ‘displacement effects’ of war, which legitimised state action.14 
New right readings interpreted the same processes first as vote-seek-
ing by cavalier politicians, and later as the errors of socialism, which 
overturned the successes of capitalist welfare.15
The following discussion asks how well this welfare economics 
model of sectors explains historical transformation in the hospital. 
Its appropriateness need not be presumed prima facie, for its different 
components were designed to illuminate the present, not to explain 
change. Despite the accoutrements of social science, such theory was 
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usually developed from assumptions about behaviour rather than 
empirical testing. Where causation was identified, it was generally 
in very unspecific terms, evoking broad shifts of majority opinion in 
liberal democracies. Nonetheless, in what follows it provides a useful 
heuristic to begin thinking about the problems of growth, change and 
decline within the three hospital sectors. 
Before 1948: patterns of growth and sectoral distribution
The first point to make is that markets do not appear to have pre-
vailed in early hospital provision. In the modern period, the private 
hospital was most obviously discernible in the area of psychiatric care. 
By about 1800 surveys of the institutional distribution of ‘lunatic’ patients 
showed approximately 200 in private ‘madhouses’, with some 600 in 
charitable asylums (the York ‘Retreat’ for Quakers is the best known), 
and uncertain numbers in the parish or union workhouses and gaols.16 
It seems plausible that small-scale market operators met demand from 
families unable to manage insane kin, although many inmates were in 
fact admitted under contract from Poor Law authorities.17 The main trend 
through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the massive 
expansion of the public sector, following legislation in 1808 to establish 
rate-funded county asylums. Thenceforth there was a very large rise in 
the numbers of ‘lunatic’ admissions—from 477 in 1819-20, to 7,144 in 
1850, to 74,004 in 1900—though part of this represented transfers from 
existing Poor Law accommodation.18 Private patients were subsequently 
only a small proportion of the whole: nineteen per cent in 1844, to eleven 
per cent in 1870 and nine per cent in 1890.19
The other manifestation of the public hospital was the infirmary 
function of the Poor Law workhouse. Parish Poor Law accommodation 
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dates back to the Elizabethan origins of statutorily enshrined localist 
poor relief. The power to incorporate several parishes to provide a large 
institution from a broader resource base was originally limited to act 
of Parliament and thus confined to London and major cities—about 
fifteen had done so by 1712.20 Sporadic surveys suggest 129 workhouses 
were open by 1725, 700 by 1732 and by the 1770s there were some 2,000 
institutions, with about 90,000 places.21 Gilbert’s Act of 1782 permitted 
autonomous combinations of parishes into unions, encouraging more 
construction. Workhouses accommodated a mix of inmates including 
the insane, sufferers of infectious diseases, infirm older people, orphaned 
children, homeless or tramping workers, stigmatised single mothers and 
the destitute. The mid-nineteenth century saw systematisation through 
the Poor Law Amendment Act (1834), which created larger administra-
tive ‘Unions’ and a network of institutions financed by local taxes. The 
pattern of the mid-century was initially for approvals of general work-
house building with standardised designs, and subsequently for more 
specialised units, particularly sick wards, within building complexes.22 
Thus, by the early 1900s some workhouses in larger cities had developed 
as public infirmaries, while others had separate infirmary blocks. 
Meanwhile, from the 1870s a network of infectious diseases hospi-
tals emerged, also funded through local property taxes and managed 
by borough and district councils.23 These provided isolation facilities 
for those with notifiable infectious diseases, such as smallpox, scarlet 
fever, typhoid and diphtheria. In 1929 a Local Government Act carried 
forward the development of public general hospitals by ‘breaking-up’ 
the Poor Law and transferring its functions to local councils, who could 
then remove the infirmaries from the stigmas of poor relief and manage 
them as municipal institutions, from which citizens would not be deterred. 
By 1938, as Table 5.1 shows for England, the public infirmaries—general, 
poor law or isolation—remained the most important provider in respect 
of medical care, and also dominated the psychiatric field.
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Table 5.1: Numbers and Percentage Distribution of Hospital Beds  
by Type (excluding asylums) 1861-1938
As for the voluntary hospitals, an early wave of foundations in 
the capitals and provincial cities occurred in the eighteenth century, 
bringing about sixty general and special hospitals into existence.24 
The endowed trust was superseded as main philanthropic vehicle 
by this new style subscriber charity, in which donors were issued 
with admission tickets that they could dispense to applicants (with 
emergency patients admitted automatically).25 After 1800 general 
hospitals opened in most large towns, while specialist institutions 
(maternity, ophthalmic, ear, nose and throat etc.) followed. Finally, 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century a cottage hospital 
movement promoted smaller rural institutions.26 Medical education 
was supplied at the largest voluntary hospitals, first by honorary con-
sultants providing clinical teaching for apprentices and subsequently 
through formal links with medical schools.27 By the early twentieth 
century, the transition of voluntary hospitals from primarily phil-
anthropic to primarily medical institutions was complete, with the 
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teaching hospitals now major centres of research, laboratory-based 
diagnosis, clinical training and care.28
What about private care? Pay-beds or wards for general medicine 
were also located in voluntary hospitals, in small numbers, and by 
the 1930s some had built private blocks as money-making concerns. 
In London, where these were most numerous, there were 552 paying 
beds for middle-class patients in 1921, rising to 2,260 by 1938, nearly 
11% of the total.29 This reflected the presence of technical services like 
radiotherapy and orthopaedic surgery, which removed the social stigma 
of entering a hospital. By the 1920s there were also considerable num-
bers of small nursing and maternity homes, with about 26,000 beds.30 
Some were managed by qualified nurses, where eminent doctors at-
tended wealthy patients. Others, prior to licensing legislation (1927), 
were run by unqualified people, and included centres of complementary 
healing, rest cures, and ‘massage houses’.31 There was also a trend to-
wards means-tested user fees in the interwar voluntaries, to compensate 
for the diminution of philanthropic largesse that followed rising tax 
burdens. However, this was quickly offset by the expansion of mass 
contributory schemes based principally on small payroll deductions. 
Given the small scale of the for-profit sector, a private medical insurance 
system was slow to develop.32
How does this first phase fit the specifications of welfare economics 
for state and voluntarism as reaction for market failure? There seems 
no evidence that the modern hospital sprang from an inadequate pri-
vate sector. Nor had that been true of the early or pre-modern hospital. 
As Guenther Risse’s longue durée global survey suggests, the hospital 
has since early times been a ‘house of ritual’, with its disciplines, daily 
routines, uniformed staff and ward organisation.33 Over the very long 
run, an interplay between religion and the state seems to have been 
the driver, whether in the sacred settings of Ancient Greek Asclepeiae, 
or Roman legionary hospitals, or monastic infirmaries, or medieval 
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leper houses, or in the ‘hospitals’ for orphaned children. An ethic of 
‘caritas’ on the one hand, and on the other the expression of collective 
purpose by ruling elites, have always mattered most, not the imperative 
of commerce. 
It could however be argued that the new public hospitals responded 
to a different kind of market failure under early capitalism. Foucault’s 
concept of a ‘great confinement’ discernible across Europe puts it in simple 
terms. New spaces of constraint were created by governments—France’s 
hôpital general, Britain’s workhouse, the German Zuchthaus—to house 
populations defined by their place outside the labour force, including 
the mad, the sick, the ‘beggar’, the ‘vagabond’ and the ‘moral libertine’.34 
For Foucault, this was the assertion of ‘bourgeois order’ through the local 
arms of the state.35 The British workhouses, in which public hospital care 
became embedded, restricted mobility by localising entitlement. Eligibility 
was also anchored to the complementary ‘out-relief’ system, providing 
doles to manage labour market seasonality. More than this though, 
they represented the liberal creed that poverty amongst working-age 
adults was moral failing, legitimising crusades against out-relief after 1834 
and again in the 1870s.36 The gradual distinction between the hospital 
and workhouse function was therefore in part a recognition that sickness 
caused poverty regardless of character—the germ of the catastrophic 
costs insight—and so justifiable as both humanity and efficiency.37 Yet the 
underlying rationale of separating categories of pauper into deserving 
and undeserving of aid also meant that as medicalisation proceeded 
standards tended to be low, with the work disdained by doctors. 38
The rise of the county asylums also testifies to the default role of 
the state, rather than the market or charity, in segregating and managing 
populations unable to negotiate the transition to modernity. Alongside 
traditional physical restraint, the public asylum adopted new thera-
peutic routines, which sought to manage insanity in an environment of 
work, morality and order that instilled social norms and self-control.39 
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Scholarship typically treats the expanding populations of county asylums 
as a response to rapid urbanisation, which disrupted the solidarities of 
kinship and community through which emotional distress and psychi-
atric illness had formerly been dealt.40 Thus, as fast as the state provided 
accommodation, so isolated individuals or the families of the insane 
increased their utilisation—an early manifestation of ‘Roemer’s Law’, 
that demand for health services tends to follow supply.41
What explains the emergence of the British voluntary hospital? 
In the European context, this was unusual, as elsewhere a single hos-
pital sector that blended philanthropy and public financing was more 
typical. In part, the voluntary hospital was the obverse of the Poor Law, 
similarly founded on assessment of entitlement. Its patients were those 
who merited benevolent support rather than state assistance premised 
on dependency; here was more forthright acknowledgement that unpre-
dictable and potentially catastrophic illness could impoverish prudent 
wage-earners. This judgment manifested in the inpatient admission system 
revolved around obtaining a subscriber’s letter from a local dignitary 
or businessperson. In practice the ‘deserving/undeserving’ binary was 
muddy, with quite similar patient populations and voluntary admissions 
favouring recent in-migrants without a Poor Law settlement or kinship 
support. Voluntary provision was therefore also a way of managing the 
labour mobility necessary for economic growth, by prioritising adults of 
working age with maladies susceptible to cure. 42 The ubiquity of major 
local employers as donors or subscribers (increasingly through firms 
rather than as individuals) ought not to be read as kindness alone.43
However, it would be reductionist to attribute the voluntary hos-
pital entirely to concerns for human capital and social order. Part of the 
explanation lies with the supply side: the charitable resources generated 
by the peculiar combination of factors that underlay British economic 
dynamism—high agricultural productivity, colonial ‘ghost acres’ pow-
ering trade, finance and services, and the classic industrial revolution 
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in textiles, metals and cheap energy. Also important was the social and 
political appeal of voluntary association to the urban middle classes.44 
This provided the basis of a new public sphere that undergirded net-
works of trust, sociability and civic action for both men and women. 
The personalised admission ticket system also tightened bonds of ob-
ligation within hierarchical societies, in ways that the depersonalising 
Poor Law did not. Finally, because the voluntary hospitals largely accom-
modated ‘deserving’ patients with acute diseases, honorary consultants 
could work in them without loss of social status. Hence it was here that 
biomedicine became grounded once the Paris revolution in clinical practice 
diffused outwards, and a more thoroughgoing medicalisation took place. 
1942-8 Explaining the critical juncture
For the hospital, the mid-twentieth century establishment of the 
British NHS marked a distinct break in several respects. The broad pa-
rameters of the 1946-7 legislation ensured universal population coverage, 
comprehensive service provision meeting needs ‘from cradle to grave’, 
and progressive tax-funding which rendered access free at the point 
of use. 45 Within this settlement, voluntary hospitals were ‘transferred’ 
from their ‘governing body or trustees’ and ‘vested’ in the Minister of 
Health.46 Effectively this was compulsion, though hospitals could apply 
to be ‘disclaimed’; 230 were so treated, mostly small religious institu-
tions, hospices and convalescent homes.47 They now came under the 
control of appointed statutory bodies, which also oversaw the former 
Poor Law and local government hospitals. Existing charitable endow-
ments were taken over by the state, although the teaching hospitals 
retained theirs, with the restriction that they could only be spent on 
‘non-core NHS’ areas: amenities for patients and staff, medical research, 
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and building improvements. Financing came from general taxation, 
supplemented by a small proportion from national insurance. This built 
on a growing consensus about the justice of basing state revenue on 
high levels of income tax, both as a response to the Depression, then to 
finance the war effort.48 Along with the demise of locally raised funding 
went grassroots democracy, hitherto exercised through the local ballot 
box or on voluntary hospital management committees (which by the 
1930s, combined patrician, bourgeois and worker governors).49 Instead 
control now resided with the central state, through the accountability 
of the Minister of Health to Parliament. Private beds were permitted 
to continue, as a necessary compromise to win professional consent 
for the reform, but hospital consultants (though not GPs) now became 
salaried staff. 
The short-term narrative of change runs as follows. In the late 
1930s a momentum grew amongst health bureaucrats, ‘think-tanks’, 
progressive doctors and leftist social reformers in favour of health sys-
tem reform, with ministerial discussions sparked by funding difficulties 
in the London teaching hospitals. During wartime, the policy process 
quickened pace, in response to ‘Assumption B’ of the Beveridge Report, 
which stated the necessity of a comprehensive health service within 
a universalist welfare state. The coalition government introduced 
proposals for this, including reform of voluntary hospital funding, 
sidelining charity and mutualism in favour of taxation, and this in 
turn sharpened debate about how public accountability would follow. 
The interest groups (doctors, hospital leaders, contributory schemes, 
local government) disagreed on the optimal arrangements and dead-
lock ensued. Labour’s sweeping victory in 1945 gave Bevan a free hand 
to override these interests with his bold solution, for in reality only the 
doctors wielded any political leverage. The BMA was duly pacified 
with the concession on private beds, and by generous remuneration: 
GPs remained mostly private contractors to the service, while hospi-
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tal consultants became salaried. On 5 July 1948, the ‘appointed day’, 
the NHS was launched. 
Does the welfare economics model, which foregrounds volun-
tary failure and shifting ‘majority opinion’, provide an adequate 
explanation for the hospital settlement? There is good evidence that 
spatial distribution of voluntary hospital beds was highly uneven, 
and often inequitable. The ‘caprice of charity’, in Aneurin Bevan’s 
words, favoured London and wealthy towns like Bath and Oxford, 
while manifesting an ‘inverse care law’ of under-resourcing in poor 
areas like South Wales.50 However, the pattern of municipal hospital 
provision was increasingly plugging these gaps, and in this sense a 
public/voluntary mix still remained viable.51 Charitable insufficiency 
also challenged some hospitals. Current account deficits and ero-
sion of capital reserves worsened during the 1930s, as expenditure 
on staffing, equipment and supplies soared. In part this reflected 
the inability of middle-class philanthropy to keep pace with patient 
needs, and although the voluntary sector also generated the solu-
tion of mass contributory schemes, these further fueled demand.52 
Again though, financial shortages were limited to particular areas 
and types of hospital (such as teaching hospitals in London and the 
North West) and there were also locations where the charity of major 
donors and community activists remained robust.53 Bevan also made 
clear he found voluntary paternalism ‘repugnant’, and there is some 
evidence of class resentment at hospital patronage in Mass Observa-
tion surveys and diaries.54 Finally, voluntary particularism was also 
critiqued in a policy discourse replete with tropes like ‘co-ordination’, 
‘integration’ and ‘co-operation’ that highlighted the disjointed na-
ture of the existing provision. Though yoked to greater state agency, 
this was, paradoxically, a language of the market, derived from indus-
trial management where the vertical integration of the firm similarly 
promised systematic planning and cost saving.55
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Beyond this, the case for a shifting social climate in favour of a 
centralised single-payer system is implicit, not overt. The marked 
transition of voluntary funding from benevolence to mass contribution 
(albeit with some charitable overtones) could be read as signalling public 
acceptance of collective funding, rather than enduring commitment to 
voluntarism. This was certainly the interpretation of Ministry of Health 
civil servants.56 Also heralding change was the demise of the Poor Law, 
now incorporated within local government, and renamed ‘public assis-
tance’ to destigmatise access. The idea that consuming public services 
was a right of citizenship became accepted, and a broad consensus was 
established around the existing tax and social insurance structure that 
maintained it.57 That said though, there is no evidence in contemporary 
opinion poll data of thirst for reform. On the contrary, most were satisfied 
with the existing mixed economy, and this only changed somewhat in 
1942-5 after the Beveridge Report was disseminated.58
In sum, while the welfare economics model provides context for the 
NHS system change, its evidence is too ambiguous to offer a fundamental 
explanation. Other causes were contingent, such as the effect of the Second 
World War, ratcheting the pace of state action through the creation of an 
Emergency Medical Service. This empowered government to manage the 
whole hospital sector to cope with civilian and military war casualties, 
stabilising hospital finances, rationalising labour flows, and accustoming 
the population to public control.59 Another relevant consideration is the 
role of the labour movement. The comparative historiography, pointing 
for example to the Scandinavian and New Zealand experience, argues 
that in periods of social democratic party-political control, welfare policy 
will be more generous and expansive.60 To the extent that the NHS was 
the creation of a majority Labour government, and Bevan himself a left-
wing tribune schooled in the coalminers’ union, this has some salience. 
But again, it is an incomplete account. Much of the reform process had 
occurred earlier, under the cross-party wartime coalition government. 
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Moreover, while some socialists and trade unionists clearly advocated 
public provision, Britain’s labour movement had no unitary position.61 
Many trade unionists were also voluntary hospital worker governors, 
content with the status quo; others favoured extending coverage through 
social insurance, not taxation; and the left generally envisaged a local 
government health service, not one under the central state.62
A final aspect of this complex web of causes is the ‘institutionalist’ 
analysis, which argues that the nature of the state and the legislative 
process is the key determinant.63 The British state had several features 
that facilitated radical change. It was essentially a two-party system, 
where elections periodically delivered the winner a strong governing 
majority, where legislative proposals came predominantly from Cabinet, 
where members’ loyalty to the party whip was the norm, and where law 
making was unhampered by an obstructive second chamber or a complex 
committee system. Also in play were path-dependent processes—in the 
sense of former policy decisions that shaped later trajectories. In particu-
lar, the early introduction of national health insurance (NHI) in 1911 had 
accustomed much of the population to state entitlements, while raising 
expectations for their expansion (not least to include hospital coverage). 
64 NHI had also undermined the opposition of the British Medical Asso-
ciation. Formed in 1832, since the 1890s this had functioned increasingly 
as the doctor’s trade union, initially defending their interests as friend-
ly society employees.65 Though vocally opposing the NHS proposals, 
its membership proved more amenable, having experienced the personal 
economic advantages of state provision since 1911. Probably ministers also 
concluded that apparently implacable hostility was just sabre-rattling. 
A narrow welfare economics explanation therefore furnishes only 
part of the context for the coming of Britain’s NHS, and the consequent 
impact on hospitals. Other contributing factors were the impact of war, 
the position of labour and the conducive institutional setting, and last but 
not least, the electoral mathematics favouring the Atlee government.66
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1948-2010 The changing pattern of hospital  
provision and utilisation
In the NHS era, the pattern of sectoral distribution had changed, 
such that hospitals were now predominantly public institutions. Initially 
only limited private provision remained under the new dispensation, 
although, as Table 5.2 illustrates, it was soon to grow. 
Table 5.2: Private Medicine under the NHS, UK 1955-2009






Private Medical Insurance    Independent Acute Hospitals
Population 
Coverage % Hospitals Beds
Private spend
as % UK total
1970 930 3.6
1975 1,087 4.1
1980 1,647 6.4 154 7,035
1985 2,380 8.9 200 9,955 9.9
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It had survived a fierce debate when the Labour government 
(1974-9) sought to phase out pay beds in NHS hospitals. Not only 
did this boost separate private hospital foundations, it also failed in 
its own terms, with NHS pay beds first falling from 4,919 (1974) to 
2,819 (1981), then rising to 3,144 by 1983, following legislation reinsti-
tuting NHS consultants’ rights to private practice.67 Private hospital 
expansion of capacity also followed the fostering of commercial med-
ical insurance by government from the 1980s. Insurance companies 
such as BUPA and Medicash were descendants of the contributory 
scheme movement, initially retaining a non-profit stance and socially 
responsible ethics.68 Another pre-war philanthropic foundation, 
the Nuffield Trust, became a significant hospital provider outside 
the NHS. Other private insurers and hospitals were more purely 
commercial, and their presence in the British medical market was aided 
in the 1990s and 2000s by the liberalisation of international trade in 
services, promoted by the European Union and the World Trade Organ-
isation.69 More recently, a policy of encouraging NHS commissioners to 
consider ‘any qualified provider’ when tendering for services opened 
further opportunities for sectoral growth.
The other main pattern of change, shown in Table 5.3, lay within 
the public sector. This was the relative decline of the hospital as a 
locus of health care, in favour of primary and community settings. 
The downward trend of utilisation, and the accompanying reduction 
in bed numbers was visible first and most markedly in the psychiatric 
hospitals. Here volumes began a sequential decline from the 1950s, 
which continued in the 1960s, after the then Minister of Health, Enoch 
Powell, inaugurated a closure policy. A famous speech conjured grim 
imagery of the asylum: ‘isolated, majestic, imperious, brooded over 
by the gigantic water-tower ... rising unmistakable and daunting out 
of the countryside’.70 Part of the aim was to incorporate psychiatric 
units in new general hospitals proposed by the 1962 Hospital Plan, 
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Source: E. Hawe and L. Cockcroft, OHE Guide to UK Health and Health Care Statistics, 
London: Office of Health Economics, 2013, 102; Kathleen Jones, History of the Mental 
Health Services, 358-9; Ewbank, Thompson, McKenna, NHS Hospital Bed Numbers, 































































































Table 5.3: NHS hospital beds and inpatients, 1951—2009/10
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further medicalising a field that had hitherto blended treatment with 
control. Partly it was to devolve greater duties of care to local authority 
welfare departments, increasingly staffed by professional social workers. 
This policy accelerated in the 1980s when it was framed as a transition 
to ‘care in the community’.71
Also underlying the numerical decline of the public hospital were 
changes to general health care. The post-war development of geriat-
ric medicine as a specialty had reduced hospitalisation of the older 
infirm. These were patients who had hitherto been abandoned to the 
‘therapeutic nihilism’ of the residential or infirmary wards of Poor 
Law institutions, where low staffing and skill levels militated against 
active treatment.72 Now bed throughput levels rose, and length of stay 
declined, again benefitting from the extension of community services 
such as home helps, home nursing and ‘meals-on-wheels’ (originally 
a wartime innovation). Over time the material fabric of the Poor Law 
legacy was replaced by new hospitals and old peoples’ homes (though 
many sturdy ex-workhouses and asylums enjoy postmodern afterlife 
as residential housing or business centres).73 Technological and surgical 
changes also reduced the length of time spent in acute hospital beds. 
Numerical decline has been long-term, since a peak in the early 1960s. 
Between 1979 and 2012 there has been there been an overall decline of 
59%. This was composed of a 35% fall in acute beds, with much larger 
reductions in geriatric (65%), psychiatric (74%), and maternity (58%) 
beds, hardly offset by a small rise in numbers of day beds (for very 
short stays) to 8.7% of the total bed stock by 2016/17.74
What can the welfare economics model contribute to explaining 
these different patterns? A ‘state failure’ argument was certainly in-
troduced by proponents of private hospitals, initially in response to 
empirical evidence of two areas of difficulty for the NHS—waiting lists, 
which were held to be caused by the moral hazard inherent in a free 
service, which produced excess demand, and the continuing spatial 
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inequities of funding, beds and specialist care, which the reform still 
had not alleviated by the 1960s.75 In the 1980s, as enthusiasm rose for 
privatisation, it was suggested these shortcomings might be obviated 
by commercialising hospital care, so that the price mechanism would 
adjust supply to demand more effectively.76 Conversely, as Thatcherite 
austerity restrained public expenditure, the argument changed. Now 
it was proposed that fostering private hospitals would ease the burden 
of state insufficiency, by siphoning well-heeled patients off towards 
comfortable paying hospitals; this justified generous tax treatment 
for private insurance.77 Subsequently, as NHS commissioning from 
the private sector increased, initially for ancillary services, and more 
recently for medical care, the emphasis changed again. Now the focus 
was on the greater efficiencies that a private hospital should be able 
to achieve, thanks to the spur of the profit motive so lacking in state 
institutions.78
The empirical evidence underpinning all this has been ambiguous 
and hampered by poor data. In the 2000s, economists evaluated the 
results of NHS contracting from ‘independent sector treatment centres’ 
(ISTCs). Critics had worried about ‘cream-skimming’, whereby ISTCs 
concentrated on less challenging procedures from which it was easier 
to make profit, thus leaving the NHS with more difficult, costly cases. 
There was some evidence for this, alongside the perceived benefits 
of driving down waiting lists.79 More recently there have been claims 
that health outcomes were better in regions where commissioners 
have the greatest choice of alternative public and private providers; 
it is hypothesised that this is because competition has galvanised 
hospital managers to greater efforts. However, the outcome data are 
limited, the underlying regressions based on imperfect mapping of 
hospital catchments onto mortality data, and the causal pathways 
uncertain.80 In sum, the survival and growth of the private sector 
needs to be understood less in terms of its positive attributes vis a vis 
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state failure. More important has been the political context in which 
it has operated, with accommodation from the left and positive en-
couragement from the right. 
What about the numerical decline of hospital beds? Neither state 
failure, nor state successes seem particularly apposite as explanations. 
Dehospitalisation has been a feature of all advanced industrial econ-
omies, with the reasons primarily located in technological change, 
the greater efficiency of surgical procedures and pharmaceutical ther-
apies, particularly of psychiatric illness. It is certainly arguable that 
British deinstitutionalisation has gone comparatively further and faster: 
in 2004, for example, the UK had about 3 acute beds per 1,000 popu-
lation, whereas European peers like Belgium (7 per 1,000), Germany 
(6.5) and France (4.7) had more. Given that these nations had mixed 
insurance modes of health funding and plural hospital ownership, then 
it may be that the tendency of the single-payer NHS towards greater 
cost-containment has been a factor.81 However, whether or not this has 
made the system relatively more vulnerable to shortages is dependent 
on other factors, such as the availability of social care accommodation, 
and the quality of treatment in primary and community settings. 
With respect to psychiatric beds, the asylum’s demise has been 
much debated by historians of madness. Their main focus has been on 
the medications that have underlain deinstitutionalisation, beginning 
with the antipsychotic chlorpromazine in the 1950s, and subsequently 
antidepressants.82 Some countered this technological account with an 
emphasis on political economy. Was the real motive for Powell’s ‘water 
tower’ speech a desire for a cheaper model of managing the disorderly 
nature of mental illness? Similar suspicions fuelled the critique of late 
twentieth-century community care. A cognate argument is that rather 
than providing a chemical ‘cure’, drug therapies work by altering 
intellectual and emotional processes in potentially harmful ways.83 
At its demise, the asylum has also had its champions, who 
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elegised its humanitarian achievement in providing refuge and care. 
However, it would be difficult to conclude from all this that the im-
perative of restraining expenditure was distinctive to the statist NHS.84 
‘Decarceration’ and the accompanying anti-psychiatry movement was 
a widespread phenomenon, spanning for example Basaglia in Italy, 
Foucault in France, Szasz, Goffmann, Kesey in the USA, and Laing in 
Scotland. If its common theme was state failure, then this was within 
a larger argument about the harmful effects of social control.
Finally, sociology provides another account of the hospitals’ demise 
that is rooted in the concept of medicalisation and neutral towards 
sectoral type.85 This begins from the argument that the hospital’s long 
run transformation from refuge to clinic was a timebound phenom-
enon. As medicine staked a claim to knowledge based on pathology 
and bacteriology, spaces were needed in which medical practitioners 
had bodies readily available for analysis. By the mid-twentieth century, 
the status of biomedicine was assured, and with the decline of infec-
tious disease the clinical gaze began to turn outside the hospital’s walls 
and into the community.86 The cancers and cardio-vascular diseases 
appeared to have preclinical causes, rooted in individual choices about 
behaviour and consumption, long preceding their morbid manifes-
tation. The result was an increasing medicalisation of society itself, 
in which a ‘surveillance medicine’ sought to turn unhealthy consum-
ers into virtuous self-governing subjects.87 Whether this claim has any 
predictive power remains to be seen. The secular decline of hospital 
capacity has certainly continued since it was enunciated, although the 
rate has slowed markedly since 2010. The advantages for fixed costs 
of concentrating expertise in large institutions seem likely to persist. 
For example, the long run retreat from home births in favour of increas-
ingly large hospital obstetric units remains almost complete, despite 
the safety advantage now having disappeared (proportion of births 
at home: 1927—85%; 1948—46%; 1965—28%; 1981—1%; 2010–2.5%).88
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1948 to 2010: NHS hospitals under the state—success or failure?
In arguing for the NHS, Bevan had claimed that centralising and 
nationalising the hospital system would eradicate the inequities of 
access determined by place and local prosperity. It would universalise 
the best, bring serenity ‘in place of fear’ and deliver efficient, effective 
care.89 The assumption behind this, and in the policy documents that 
had informed the debate, was that system integration under responsible 
administrative bodies, coupled with stable financing, would inevitably 
bring this about. How well did the public hospitals perform in the era 
of control by the central state?
Before attempting a general appraisal, it is important to note that 
hospital policy-making, however good or bad, took place within a 
budgetary envelope set from above. With charity now consigned to 
marginal areas, and income from the pay beds minimal, the scope of 
activity was determined by the annual financial settlement. In almost 
every year since 1948, this Exchequer subvention for the NHS included 
a real increase. However, as is well known, the rising proportion of older 
people in the population, and hence the overall prevalence of morbidity, 
has driven a commensurate rise in demand. Technological costs and 
culturally determined expectations of service have also fuelled this. 
However, the pace of real increase to the NHS budget has been quite 
variable over time, with three periods—the early 1950s, the 1980s-1990s, 
and the 2010s—times of relative austerity.90 All three periods have been 
episodes of Conservative government, in which NHS expenditure 
played second fiddle to broader economic policy considerations. 
International comparison also casts light on the financial con-
straints within which hospital policy must be judged. As in Table 5.4, 
this consistently shows British health expenditure to have been 
relatively modest when set against peer nations, whether viewed in 
real per capita terms, or as a proportion of GDP. 
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Table 5.4: Current health expenditure (public and private) as share 
(%) of gross domestic product, UK and comparator nations
Two conclusions are possible. One is that the NHS model has been 
particularly suitable for maximising efficiency and preventing waste. 
The other is that this kind of single payer, centralised system has been 
more vulnerable to under-funding than those based on social insurance 
(Germany, Japan), local taxation (Sweden), or plural sources (United 
States). Until the 1990s, comparative health outcome data was limited 
and tended to support the former; since then however, Britain’s poor 
ranking against indicators like avoidable mortality and cancer survival 
rates has inclined judgment to the latter.91 If so, then it is here that the 
real ‘state failure’ of the NHS model lies, with its ‘institutionalised 
parsimony’ and vulnerability to Conservative retrenchment. 92
The financial constraints of the 1950s explain the initial diffi-
culties faced by the NHS hospitals, when regional health boards 
(RHBs) and their subsidiary hospital management boards (HMBs) 
found themselves unable to implement development plans due to 
lack of resources. Indeed, capital expenditure in the 1950s ran at a 
lower level than in the 1930s. This though is explicable in terms of 
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post-war austerity, when social spending on health took second place 
to that on council housing and school building. Within this context 
the newly integrated management structure did nonetheless deliver 
some achievements. Annual accounting became standardised and sys-
tematic. Savings from fixed costs for energy and laundries, and from 
bulk order of food and supplies, could now be obtained by HMBs, 
which mostly contained a cluster of hospitals. Regional treasurers 
monitored comparative costings and alerted institutions to areas 
of potential waste. Clinical management committees planned the 
distribution of specialists within the region, ensuring that expertise 
became better allocated in light of estimated need (though inter-re-
gional disparities remained).93 Alongside this came the capacity to 
manage the overall hospital stock, for example to further the goals 
of geriatric medicine, or to repurpose the increasingly redundant 
infectious diseases hospitals. 
State direction became more ambitious in the 1960s under Enoch 
Powell’s Hospital Plan. In addition to the asylum closures, planning 
sought to establish optimum bed to patient ratios, then to meet these 
through a network of district general hospitals, which would com-
bine acute, geriatric, psychiatric and other specialty beds. Historical 
verdicts have been unkind to the Plan, though for its execution rather 
than its ambition. It transpired that Britain had neither the building 
capacity, nor sufficient technical expertise, nor the sustained pub-
lic investment capital to support the programme, and much went 
unfulfilled.94 A further problem followed the reduction of geriatric 
beds (based on a contestable ratio), which was made without proper 
reference to the capacity of social care in local government to provide 
complementary services. This was where the ‘bed-blocking’ phenom-
enon began, as the NHS vied with local authorities to shunt infirm 
patients, and their associated costs, across the imprecise health/
social care boundary.95 Here the problem was not state failure per se, 
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but rather Bevan’s decision to create bespoke administrative structures 
for the NHS, instead of situating hospitals within local government, 
where they would have sat alongside community care. 
Faith in statist system planning continued into the 1970s, when 
the problem of spatial inequity was finally tackled by the ‘RAWP’—a 
population-based formula for allocating funding to the regions and 
subsidiary districts. This was politically controversial for it meant 
moving resources away from the traditionally well-funded regions 
of London and the Home Counties to the provinces. The mid-1970s 
also saw a more concerted attempt to improve equity between dif-
ferent areas of the NHS, for the ‘Cinderella services’ of geriatrics and 
mental health had hitherto received disproportionately less funding 
than acute medicine. The programme budgeting initiative began an 
incremental adjustment towards those areas, again in response to a 
calculus of need. In both cases this represented successful, decisive 
action to overturn a stasis built into the system by history, and it 
did not emerge deus ex machina from state processes. It depended 
on conviction leadership by Labour politicians Barbara Castle and 
David Owen, and also on the emergence of experts able to frame 
and implement highly technical policy.96
From the 1980s a raft of policies was introduced that explicitly 
invoked state failure in their justification. The early Thatcher gov-
ernments sought to improve efficiency and cost effectiveness by 
introducing management techniques from the private sector, and by 
treating patients more as customers whose wishes and needs merit-
ed more attention. Notions of ‘provider capture’ were expressed by 
theoreticians of the new public management, though the political 
discourse was more focused on resolving unstable industrial relations 
and upping productivity. First came the principles of Rayner scruti-
nies—target setting, and holding regional heads to account—coupled 
with the Korner health informatics initiatives. Next was the Griffiths 
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Report, inaugurating the replacement of consensual decision-making 
by general management under a single leader. A related attempt to 
import a new cadre of managers from the business world was only 
partially successful.97
Then in 1991 came the ‘internal market’, and a more decisive step 
away from a vertically managed, statist hospital system. The idea was 
to create a hybrid structure, which retained state ownership and financ-
ing, but mimicked market dynamics. It did so by obliging hospitals 
to price and sell their services to purchasing bodies, at first mainly in 
the form of regional and local health authorities, but increasingly of 
locally clustered primary care providers. The New Labour government 
retained this model, though replaced the language of ‘purchasing’ 
with ‘commissioning’. This acknowledged the reality that there was 
little actual ‘market’ competition, because in most places purchasing 
was monopsonistic, and providing monopolistic. Gradually this was 
modified through ISTCs and what came to be called the ‘any qualified 
provider’ scheme, which encouraged commissioning from private sector 
bodies. Commerce was also to be the engine of capital improvement, 
with a ‘private finance initiative’ (PFI) now the norm for new building. 
This operated through government agreeing long-term contracts with 
private companies to build and manage hospitals, and resulted in a 
rapid expansion and renovation of the stock in the Blair/Brown years. 
Has the performance of NHS hospitals under this policy regime 
borne out the driving assumptions of state failure and market strengths? 
The evidence is mixed. The new public management reforms of the 
1980s did not prevent a growing public sense of crisis (arguably driven 
by underfunding) that in turn propelled the late Thatcher govern-
ment towards more radical change.98 Nor did early evaluations of the 
internal market show strong evidence of greater productivity. Part of 
the problem was that commissioning was complex and difficult, with 
the advantages of price information lying on the providers’ side; also, 
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its total cost within the system was opaque, rendering a historical cost/
benefit appraisal impossible.99 Considerable criticism has also been di-
rected against PFI, which locked taxpayers into some costly and disad-
vantageous contracts, just as innovative approaches were moving care 
out of hospitals. As for patient satisfaction, public opinion data shows 
that this has moved closely in step with funding levels, not structural 
reform, rising significantly during the Blair years as Labour increased 
inputs.100 All that said though, commissioning has become settled pol-
icy, and medical professionals generally approve the empowerment 
of primary care on the one hand, and the greater cost-consciousness 
of hospitals on the other. 
It should also be noted that alongside this incorporation of market 
dynamics has been a strengthening of the state’s armoury of control 
over doctors. The National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE) was 
established in 1997 to approve drugs and therapies, constraining liberty 
of prescription and treatment.101 This was accompanied by Clinical 
Framework Guidelines, which sought to standardise activities accord-
ing to best practice. The use of targets and published league tables 
of hospital activity was the state’s effort to incentivise improvement 
through ‘naming and shaming’; the initial use of this strategy in Eng-
land seemed to be delivering results, but later research suggested no 
sustained effect.102 Similarly, hospitals now had to accept the publication 
of ‘patient reported outcome measures’, which revealed success rates of 
different procedures. Finally, although the 2012 Health and Social Care 
Act attempted to remove the last vestiges of hierarchical administration, 
this quickly proved unsuccessful. The aim was to abolish regional au-
thorities, so that the hospital trusts and ‘clinical commissioning groups’ 
would become free agents, operating mostly autonomously, with only 
light touch regulation from the central state.103 Yet almost immediately 
regional authorities had to be reinvented as Structural Transformation 
Plan areas.104 Integrated planning, it transpired, was necessary after all. 
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In sum, although state failure was much invoked in recent years, 
the evidence for its existence is not compelling. Moreover, administrative 
and political preference led the British to retain a statist system, but 
seek to improve it by making it more responsive to price and demand. 
Again, it is not very clear whether these strategies have really achieved 
their goal. In 2010, as New Labour faltered, NHS indicators of pro-
ductivity, waiting times and satisfaction were all extremely positive.105 
However, it remains perfectly plausible that this is explained by the 
sustained funding increases of 2000-2010, rather than by the internal 
market model of the Blair/Brown years.
Conclusion
The main focus of this discussion has been the changing bal-
ance of the public, private and voluntary sectors in the history of the 
British hospital. It has interrogated a conceptual model drawn from 
the welfare economics literature which proposed that each sector has 
certain attributes. The hypothesis was that in the medical field, there 
are some things that the private hospital can do well, but other things 
it does badly, and so too for the voluntary and the public hospital. 
To explain change then, we might confirm empirically the existence of 
these attributes, then look for evidence of shifts in opinion about their 
relative desirability.
In applying this model to the long-run pattern of change it does 
seem to offer some helpful insight, at least based on the British case. 
For example, there was the historic marginality of the private hospi-
tal, initially important in mental health care, but quickly superseded, 
and retaining only a small share of general hospital activity, including 
under the NHS, when it served wealthier individuals seeking greater 
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comfort or speedier attention. Instead, the state and voluntary sectors 
were always dominant in hospital provision, because some form of 
collective arrangement was needed to regulate financing, above and 
beyond an individual’s capacity to pay fees. The state’s importance was 
in marshalling resources for marginal groups that sickness had cast 
outside the labour market, and whose distress needed to be managed, 
for reasons of humanity and social stability. The voluntary hospital 
emerged to provide care for sick people within the labour market, 
and was less discriminatory.
However, the welfare economics framework did not seem suffi-
cient to explain moments of significant political transition, other than 
as general context. Instead, to reach a satisfactory account of change 
was to acknowledge more complex patterns of causation, in which so-
cial and political history mattered as well as economic. This raises the 
question of whether the positivist claims on which the model draws 
are valid. Instead perhaps its assumptions about inherent attributes are 
chimera—either descriptions of transitory phenomena, or normative 
judgments? International comparison should provide further insight 
into this question, and hence into whether this way of conceptualising 
the hospital sectors is useful for understanding historical change.
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